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PRICE CONTROL IN WAR AND EMERGENCY
JULES ABELS t
THE PROBLEM-REGULATION OR REQUISITION?
Since Nebbia v. New York in I934,1 the Supreme Court has
regarded price fixing with beneficent approval where it was duly dem-
onstrated that economic circumstances necessitated so drastic an expe-
client, either under the police power of the State,2 or the Interstate
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.3 A fortiori, it may be
assumed that in the due exercise of the war power, 4 price fixing legis-
lation reasonably calculated to preserve the domestic economy from
dislocation by control of the price structure will be sustained by the
present Court.5
The basic problem presented by war-time price control involves
the constitutional necessity of awarding just compensation, either for
the product whose price is fixed, or, on the other hand, a "fair return
on fair value" for the business placed, under the price fixing yoke.
Stated in another way-are the prices as fixed by the legislative man-
date reviewable as to reasonableness by the courts, as in all familiar
instances of public utility regulation and direct governmental appro-
priation by eminent domain?
To analyze the specific problem of war-time control, it is essential
to review the judicial history of price fixing to determine its basic
nature, whether a species of regulation or requisition.
1 A. B., 1934, College of the City of New York; LL. B., 1937, Columbia Univer-
sity; M. P. A., 1941, Harvard University; member of the New York Bar; Price Con-
trol Editor, Research Institute of America, Inc.
1. 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
2.'Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 309 U. S. 310 (1940); Milk
Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 3o6 U. S. 346 (1939) ; Townsend v. Yeo-
mans, 301 U. S. 441 (1937) ; Bordefs Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251 (1936) ; Hege-
man Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 (1934).
3. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (94o) ; United States
v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939) ; H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 307 U. S. 588 (i939). For a general discussion of Federal price fixing
since Nebbia v. New York, see Polikoff, Commodity Price Fixing and the Supreme
Court (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 934.
4. For a discussion of war power, see Black, The Theory of the War Power Un-
der the Constitution (1926) 6o Am. L. REv. 3. See Miller v. United States, ii Wall.
268, 305 (U. S. 1870) ; United States v. McIntosh, 283 U. S. 6o5, 622, 623 (931). See
also note 63 infra.
5. A full discussion of price-fixing constitutionality is contained in a brief submit-
ted by David Ginsburg, General Counsel of OPA. Hearings Before Committee on
Banking and Currency on H. R. 5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (194) 310. See also Note,
American Ecomnic Mobilizatim (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 427, 477, and Hannah, Some
Aspects of Price Control in War-Time (i94i) 27 CoaN. L. Q. 21, for discussions of
war-time price control.
(675)
676 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
THE THEORY-FITTING INTO THE REGULATION CONCEPT
Regulation is the exercise of either the police power of the state
or one of the delegated powers residing in the Federal Government;
requisition is the exercise of a power inherent in sovereignty, and the
reliance upon express power is unnecessary.
It has long been established that regulation does not require com-
pensation on the part of the sovereign for damage done, though the
sovereign may, as a matter of choice, award compensation for injury
sustained incident to obedience to its decree. 6 On the other hand, just
compensation is an absolute constitutional restraint on the exercise of
the requisitioning power. It is obvious that any restriction on prop-
erty insofar as it inflicts damage or diminishes the returns from prop-
erty is pro tanto a taking of the property.7 Thus viewed from the
standpoint of the individual, regulation and taking, though supposedly
different in kind, are only different in degree. This problem as to how
far substantial damage can be inflicted in the exercise of the regulatory
power without compensation is one that has disturbed judicial thought.
Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 8 in 1922,
extending a line of thought expressed in Block v. Hirsch 9 in the pre-
vious year, stated that when the damage "reaches a certain magnitude,
in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act."
Where real property has been injured or destroyed, the magnitude
of the loss, the Mahon test, may guide the court in determining whether
a taking has occurred. As to the bulk of regulations which impinge on
the unmolested conduct of business and hence result in a diminution of
earning power, a direct appropriation to public use cannot be found
and the eminent domain principle is difficult to apply. Since the gov-
ernment's liability in requisition is based on implied contract, an injury
or destruction of property without appropriation cannot ground a claim
for reimbursement.10
6. "It has long been settled law that the imposing of uncompensated charges, in-
volved in obeying a law, passed in a reasonable exercise of the police power, is not a
taking of property without due process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Northwestern Pac. Ry. v.
Puget Sound Ry., 250 U. S. 332, 336 (1919). Freund stresses the point in Eminent
Domain (1935) IIn ENCYc. Soc. ScIENCES 493.
7. Abbot, The Police Power and the Right to Compensation (1889) 3 HLv.'L.
REv. i89, 191.
8. 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922).
9. 256 U. S. 135, 155 (1921).
io. Note cases of the last war disclaiming governmental liability for consequential
damages: U. S. Bedding Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 491 (1925); Campbell v.
United States, 266 U. S. 368 (1924); Omnia Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502
(1923) ; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 42 F.- (2d) 156 (193o). See Cormack,
Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 221.
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Regulation is aimed to produce or restrain action by the individual
-in contrast to requisition, the damage done is an ulterior result, but
not the immediate motive. In regulation, violation with punishment
or obedience with immunity hinges on the volition of the individual.
Requisition, however, is unilateral in the sense that it is executed by a
paramount power regardless of the individual will.
As an outgrowth of its volitional rather than compulsive char-
acter, the regulation is laid upon the whole community, or in another,
aspect, on a class of persons in the community, while the requisition is
applied separately to the individual owners.
Judged by these outward criteria, it is apparent that war-time price
fixing bears on its face the indicia of a regulation rather than a requisi-
tion. (I) The exercise of power is predicated on a delegated rather
than an inherent power, price fixing being designed as an implement
to the war power to promote the proper conduct of the war. (2) No
direct appropriation or enrichment results to the Government from
transactions between individuals. (3) The individual is afforded the
option to obey or defy; in this case, he may refrain from sale alto-
gether. (4) The sovereign command is applied not to individuals but
embraces the community as a whole.
THE EVOLUTION-TWARDS THE REGULATION CONCEPT
Price fixing evolved in the field of public utility regulation wherein
a modified form of eminent domain thinking has become deeply rooted
in the "fair return on fair value" doctrine. Originally, however, in
Munn v. Illinois in 1876,11 when the Court gave birth to the theory of
"affectation with the public interest" to sustain the fixing of prices
charged by grain elevators for storage (the extant interpretation of
the scope of the police power being deemed inadequate for the pur-
pose), price fixing was conceived of as a regulation rather than a
requisition. In reply to the argument that though the right to regulate
might exist, yet the rates were subject to the duty to give just compen-
sation, the Court said that "for protection against abuses by legisla-
tures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." 12 It is a
logical consequence of the regulatory principle that the amount of the
rate fixed is in the legislative discretion as one of the means adopted
to accomplish its purpose.
The dissent bore within it, however, the seeds of the later doc-
trine. Mr. Justice Field contended that though many regulations inter-
II. 94 U. S. 113 (876).
12. Id. at 134. "In his (Waite's) thought the phrase is still a generic term of com-
mon law, on all fours with 'public morals', 'public safety', and 'public health'." Hamil-
ton, Affectation With Public Interest (930) 39 Y= L. J. io89, lO96.
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fere with the use of property, they do not interfere with the compen-
sation to be demanded for that property. He inferred that an owner
has two distinct rights as to his property. The first is one in rem, and
valid regulations pertain only to that use; the second is that of absolute
protection as against all non-owners. Price regulation as a drastic
interference with that title and possession is, in all instances, the
equivalent of a taking or expropriation.
Such was the thrust of the decision in Smyth v. Ames,' 3 which
launched the Court on its weird quest for the "fair return on fair
value" formula. When the state assumes the right of regulation of
utility rates, the fair return which it allows is, in fact, the just com-
pensation required in condemnation proceedings. 14  The Government
permits the stockholders to operate the utility, but limits them to a rea-
sonable return equal to the fair rental of the perpetual leasehold on the
property.
If the "regulation" of public utilities were, technically speaking,
a regulation in the exercise of the police power, then no compensation
would be required. Thus, encompassing public utility regulation under
the "just compensation" rubric is a necessary choice. However, it is
not identical with a taking, but rather is a substantial analogy thereto,
since public utility regulation envisages a change in the value of the
going concern, while condemnation requires an exact quid pro quo,
which obviously would render futile any attempt to remedy the eco-
nomic maladjustment at which the regulation is aimed.
Having sustained price fixing in the case of utilities "affected with
the public interest," the court reversed the syllogism "by the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness", converting it into the proposition that only
where the business was so "affected" was price fixing constitutional,
the majority deducing from an a priori formulation of the nature of a
public utility.15 This viewpoint is explicable on the ground that the
limitation imposed was not on the police power but on the scope of
the "public use" in the exertion of eminent domain, businesses such
as employment agencies or theater ticket brokerage services not falling
within that category.16
13. 169 U. S. 466 (1898), discussed by Hale, The "Fair Valuw" Merry-Go-Round
(1939) 33 Iu. L. REV. 517.
14. This was stated explicitly by Roberts, J., in West v. Telephone Co., 295 U. S.
662 (1935) at 671.
15. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929) ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277
U. S. 350 (1928) ; Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927). Related cases are
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932) and Wolff Packing Co. v. Ind.
Relations Court, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
16. There are expressions in the minority opinions impugning the validity of "af-
fectation with the public interest" as a distinct category. Thus, see Brandeis, J., in
the Liebrnann case (p. 302), "The notion of a distinct category of business 'affected
with a public interest', employing property 'devoted to a public use', rests upon histori-
cal error. . . . In my opinion, the true principle is that the State's power extends
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During this period, however, the Court was constrained to recog-
nize the inexpediency of following the doctrine consistently. Thus,
though insurance companies were placed within the orbit of the rule,
the Court in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde 7 stated that it was unnec-
essary that aggregate collections of premiums fixed as to amount by
the state yield a reasonable profit to all companies engaged in the busi-
ness. Similarly, Tagg Bros. .& Moorhead v. United States I tends to
support the conclusion that uniform rates imposed on an entire indus-
try would be sustained if compensatory to a reasonable number. A
ready rationalization is offered by the sound principle, unfortunately
not too fully explored, that an inefficient public utility is not entitled
to a return equal to that of its more efficient brother.
With Nebbia v. New York, price fixing voyaged on new seas.
The depression revealing itself in a malady of prices, the effort of
price adjustment has gone beyond the immediate raising or lowering
of price to the control of the price structure in order to prevent an evil
of great harm to the public, the purpose conforming to the accepted
notion of the use of the police power. The predominant tone of the
Nebbia decision is one stressing the intimate connection between the
disrupted price structure and the moribund state of an industry
engaged in the distribution of a commodity indispensable for public
health. Similarly, in Sushine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins 1o in
i94o, upholding the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, the Court dwelt
on the dislocations of a vital national industry, and the concomitant
evils resulting from an uncontrolled price structure.
The validation of minimum price fixing per se did not raise the
issue of just compensation, since a floor is thereby set under cut-throat
competition, the state's action being comparable to that made by the
meinbers of an industry for their own benefit. However, the issue
was specifically litigated in Hegeman Corp. v. Baldwin,2 0 wherein it
was claimed that the differential between the minimum price to be
paid to the producer for milk, and the price determined by competi-
tion was confiscatory as inadequate to cover operating expenses. To
to every regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for the public
protection." However, this should be understood as referring to the substantive right
of regulation, not to the correspondent incidents of the powers. Thus, see Holmes, J.,
in the Tyson case (p. 446), "The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation
when compensation is duw, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it
has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it." (Italics supplied.)
17. 275 U. S. 44o 447 (1928). The Court had previously held that insurance com-
panies are "affected with the public interest". German Alliance Co. v. Kansas, 233
U. S. 389 (1914).
IS. 280 U. S. 420 (1930). Rates for stockyards services upheld, though confisca-
tory as to some of the plaintiffs. Cf. Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426 (1936).
19. 310 U. S. 381 (1940).
2o. 293 U. S. 163 (1934).
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this objection, Cardozo gave short shrift, succinctly distinguishing the
case from that of a public utility.
"Much is made of a supposed analogy between the plight in
which the appellant finds itself, and that of public utilities sub-
jected to maximum rates that do not yield a fair return. But the
analogy, when scrutinized, is seen to be unreal. A public utility
in such circumstances has no outlet of escape. If it is running its
business with reasonable economy, it must break the law or bleed
to death. But that is not the alternative offered when the law pre-
scribes a minimum. An outlet is then available to the regulated
business, an outlet that presumably will be utilized whenever use
becomes expedient. If the price is not raised, the reason must be
that efficient operators find that they can get along without a
change. Either that must be so, or else, as was pointed out in
the opinion below, the industry will perish." 21
The adoption of the theory of regulation was even more explicitly
stated in the lower court decision by Learned Hand,2 2 who demon-
strated that price fixing no more impairs the ownership and disposition
of property than a myriad of regulations affecting use.
Maximum price fixing in a competitive industry in which there is
a disparity in operating expenses immediately raises the serious prob-
lem of the means of guaranteeing a fair return to all its members.
Just compensation to the less efficient firms results in an exorbitant
return to the more efficient-just compensation to the more efficient
results in a confiscatory return to the less efficient. In the Adkin..w
case, in which maximum as well as minimum prices were upheld, the
issue of just compensation was met by the administrative rule of price
fixing under which the Bituminous Coal Commission is charged to
act. This rule is designed to guarantee each mine a fair return on the
fair value of its property. The elaborate administrative mechanism
was alluded to by the Court relative only to the definitiveness of the
administrative standard in the delegation of legislative power. The
Court did not indicate that such a method was required as a substantive
adjunct to price fixing.
21. Id. at '7'.
22. 6 F. Supp. 297, 298 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). "All sorts of regulations may affect
the price of materials or machinery necessary to another industry. The elimination of
fire hazards may require high rents; they may not be attainable. The observance of
sanitary regulations in factories may be expensive; more than the market will bear.
Conformity with prescribed standards of quality and packing may turn a living profit
into a loss. . . . If the plaintiff be right, in every case the validity of the regulation
would depend upon whether the addition to the cost resulted in the elimination of some
of the producers. Legislation could scarcely go on at all if its indirect results, its final
incidence, must be so nicely adjusted. . . . The 'Police Power' was sometimes
spoken of as though it concerned only 'health and safety'. That mode has disappeared;
the purpose of the State of New York to preserve its dairy industry may involve re-
mote repercussions as mortal to some individuals as its purpose to abolish sweatshops;
but once it be agreed that the state may interpose for either end in the 'free play of
supply and demand', the incidents follow."
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The perpetuation of the concept of requisition with price control
is one that is not longer supportable on the ground of the distinction
between use and disposition of property. Regulations as to use affect
final price; the existence of a multitude of regulations directly imping-
ing on freedom of disposition of property is unquestioned.
In public utilities the "taking" concept is so deeply imbedded that
it cannot be dislodged. But ascribing legal homogeneity to all efforts
at price control seems to be unfounded. The nature of such control is
multiform. There is a clear difference between control in which the
effort is directed only at lowering price, and control which is aimed
at the larger repercussions to the economy resulting from distorted
prices. The latter is properly within the legitimate scope of the police
power, the former, perhaps, may be justified only when the business is
"affected with the public interest." 23 The differentiation of a public
utility from an ordinary business was underscored by Cardozo in the
Hegeman case on an additional ground-in the case of the non-utility
there is always the option to withdraw to avoid the loss occasioned by
the legislative act (the usual attribute of the regulation). The rate
set by the legislature is a matter of "statecraft"; the sole limitation,
he implies, is that the law must not have the ultimate effect of destruc-
tion of the industry as a whole. Such is the frontier of the arbitrary
and unreasonable.
Attention must be directed to the larger purpose that price fixing
has in mind, with price fixing as merely the device to achieve that end.
War-time price control, focusing on its purpose and effect, rather than
outward form, is intimately connected with those ends toward which
the police power (or war power) is properly exerted.
WITHOUT STATTE-A REQUISITION MEDiUM
To facilitate an analysis of war-time price fixing from the stand-
point of regulation and requisition, it is desirable to make two logical
divisions of the subject matter. In the first stage of control, the gov-
ernment is involved as a huge purchaser from private industry; in the
second stage, the government, to protect the civilian population from
exploitation, regulates the prices of civilian commodities previously
unregulated as to price.
In the first step on which the government embarks, the assump-
tion of the role of a gigantic entrepreneur, the government's legal rela-
tionship with industry is constructed on the foundation of a requisi-
23. Note that after the Nebbia case, state courts continued to hold statutes uncon-
stitutional on the ground that the businesses were not "affected with the public interest."
See Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala. 622, 173 So. 266 (1937) ; Becker v. State, 37 Del. 454,
185 Atl. 92 (1936) ; Duncan v. Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N. W. 547 (1936).
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tion, rather than a regulation. Section 9 of the Burke-Wadsworth
Act, 24 substantially similar to the National Defense Act of 1916, is a
commandeering statute. The positive control exercised by the govern-
ment rests on three functions, commandeering, priority, and price fix-
ing. It is erroneous to regard these as disjoined-on the contrary,
priority is merely the reverse side of the price fixing coin, and price
fixing is an outgrowth of the power to commandeer and administer
priorities.
Priority is the widest and most important of the war-time con-
trols. It introduces a scheme powerful in its effects for maximizing
production, and synchronizing production and deliveries for war use.
It is also one of the strongest weapons in the hands of the government
for enforcing its industrial control measures.
In the view of the essentiality of the control, it is important to
understand its legal nature. Priority is a Janus-Headed device. There
is the priority of industry vis-a-vis the government, and there is the
priority of industry vis-a-vis its subcontractors. Facing the govern-
ment, the industry is confronted with a duty-facing its subcontrac-
tors, it is endowed with a right. Strictly speaking, under existing law,
priority is the corollary of the requisition since, if the government
takes by eminent domain, whether in fiction or fact, it is obviously
entitled to be served first. Thus the present express statutory grant
of government priority is mere redundancy. There were suits in the
courts for breach of contract by private contractors against industries
which, because of subsequent contractual liability to the government,
were unable to fulfill their contracts. The defense of impossibility of
performance was sustained in Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore &
Tierney, Inc.25 and Meawhimsey v. Milbrook Mills,2 6 the courts recog-
nizing the coercive nature of the contracts, whether or not voluntarily
solicited, thus sanctioning priority in connection with a government
contract, since a taking is implied.
Secondary priority is of a different content, however. It is the
more important since in addition to canalizing production 'throughout
the economy beyond the primary contractor, it is the inducement to
contract with the government in return for the vital privilege of obtain-
24- 54 STAT. 885 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. § 309 (Supp. 1941).
25. 265 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
26. 231 N. Y. 29o, 132 N. E. 93 (1921). Note the Court's statement at 300 (32
N. E. at 96). "The one who gave his service with alactrity under such conditions
should at least be considered with as much favor as he who held back until threatened
or his property commandeered. The laggard who feared the financial results under his
civilian contracts merits no encouragement. The fact that the defendant may have
sought or welcomed the government work is immaterial. The fact is the government
gave it orders which had to be filled at once. The Act of Congress, the necessity of
the times, brooked no delay." Cf. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States,
259 U. S. 75 (1922). See also Brown, The Effect of Conscription of Industry on Con-
tracts for the Sale of Goods (1942) 90 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 533.
PRICE CONTROL IN WAR AND EMERGENCY
ing necessary materials. Herein there is no privity between the gov-
ernment and its subcontractors, the choice of whom has been made
by the contractor. The government sanctions a devolution of author-
ity on the contractor whose selectees are automatically endowed with
priority. Where a party to a contract was unable to obtain materials
due to lack of priority, a defense of impossibility of performance was
held defective, and this decision seems doctrinally correct, since there
was no government takingY. Similarly, a subcontractor who is unable
to perform because he is supplying a government contractor, would
probably not be excused from performance on the ground of a taking.
The legal authority to enforce priority orders must therefore rest on a
different basis. The government during the last war had taken posses-
sion of the railroad system and had asserted dominion over the fuel
supply. It thus based its power to dictate policy for the entire economy
on its ability to cut off non-conformers from transportation and fuel.
While the authority of the War Industries Board to administer
priorities was partial, being coordinate to the requisition, its authority
to fix prices was non-existent. In a narrow sense, the Board did not
fix prices, since the prices were agreed on by the members of the
industry after consultation with the Price Fixing Committee. Osten-
sibly the agreements were voluntary-in fact, they were executed under
veiled coercion, the threat of commandeering, or later the more effec-
tive threat, the denial of the coveted priority. The shift of emphasis
from the universal spirit of cooperation stressed in the Baruch report
of 1921 to his blunt admission of the use of duress in his testimony
in 1931 is striking. At the latter time he admitted that unliversal com-
pliance was obtainable only with the aid of potential compulsion, and
that "price fixing by agreement" was a euphemism on the same plane
as referring to registrants for the draft as "Mass Volunteers". 28
The formula which the government employed to induce price
agreements was as follows:
"These are the prices to which the government will agree; if
you are willing to enter into a voluntary arrangement with us, you
will be paid these prices for your goods, but if you refuse to do
so, we will be compelled to ask the properly constituted authori-
ties to commandeer your output or your plant and give you just
compensation therefor as provided by statute." 29
27. Town of North Hempstead v. Public Service Corp., lO7 Misc. 19, 176 N. Y.
Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd inem., ig2 App. Div. 924, 19o N. Y. Supp. 955 (2d
Dep't, 1921); Crown Embroidery Works v. Gordon, 19o App. Div. 472, i8o N. Y.
Supp. 158 (Ist Dep't, 192o), aff'd inem., 196 App. Div. 937, 187 N. Y. Supp. 932 (Ist
Dep't, 1921).
28. Hearings Before War Policies Comminrsion on H. J. Res. 251, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1931) 817. For the legal effect of the agreement, see Cardozo, J., in Standard
Chemicals v. Waugh, 231 N. Y. 51, 58, 131 N. E. 566, 568 (1921).
29. GAaEr, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER PRICES (1920) 235.
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The legal section of the Board on June ii, i918, concluded that
a threat to commandeer expressed in this form to induce the fixing of
price did not constitute duress.30 At a later time, with the smooth
functioning of secondary priority, a threat to choke an industry by
withholding vital supplies supplanted commandeering as the more
potent threat.
Prior to the present statute, price orders of the Office of Price
Administration (hereinafter referred to as OPA) were admittedly
enforced by threats. All schedules stated that offenders would be
exposed to public censure, and would be boycotted by procurement
officials. Additionally, the government could requisition at will, and
use the priorities and allocations machinery to punish recalcitrants.
It is thus evident that the common matrix of the three weapons
of control exercised by the government in the absence of a price con-
trol law is the concept of requisition. Generated out of conscription
thinking, the "Draft Industry" Amendment congrues with the popular
feeling that the burdens of war should be "equalized" as between prop-
erty and human beings. The proponents of such a course, by mistaken
analogy with the conscription of manpower, have been led to emphasize
the use and implementation of the requisition as a method of control.
However, in studying the purport and operation of the Burke-
Wadsworth Act more closely, it appears that the government is need-
lessly encumbering itself by proclaiming the use of the device of requi-
sition where the effect may be most expeditiously attained by regula-
tion, and where, in fact, the compulsion may carry all the external
characteristics of a regulation. The Act is burdened with an inherent
logical inconsistency arising out of the reliance on the requisition; it
operates detrimentally to restrict governmental authority; in addition,
the legality of price fixing attained by the indirect approach rests on
uncertain ground.
INCONSISTENCY IN THE BURKE-WADSWORTH ACT
In considering the structure of the Burke-Wadsworth Act we
should note that it contemplates two takings. The government is
vested with the power to place orders with any concern for such prod-
ucts or materials as are required and are being produced by that firm,
and grants the power to determine reasonable and just prices for that
3o. It is true that at common law a threat to do what one had a legal right to do
did not constitute duress. There is a. plethora of authority, however, for the modem
rule that duress is a question of fact to be determined in each case, and the character
of the threat is relevant only in determining whether the state of mind was induced by
the threat employed. Where parties to a contract are not bargaining at arm's length,
but on unequal terms, arising out of a position to dictate due to the public or institu-
tional character of one of the parties, a finding of duress may be readily made, despite
the legality of the threat.
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product. Such an order is considered a "compulsory order" or a
"commandeering of the output" of that firm; the price fixed by the
executive agency is the measure of "just compensation" adopted,
reviewable by the courts. However, if the industry withholds acqui-
escence, then another commandeering may occur-that of the plant
itself. The question inevitably presents itself-if the government in
the first case is taking by eminent domain, how can the lack of consent
of the owner interpose any obstacle, since it is of the very essence of
eminent domain that the property is taken from its owner volens
nolens? 31
The answer, to be sure, is that there is no res in existence to take,
since the product is only in potems, and will be available for requisition
only if the owner chooses to comply with the government order. Thus
the compulsion to produce, if enforceable in all instances, would be
tantamount to involuntary servitude. This question apparently vexed
H. M. Channing, Chief of the Legal Section of the War Industries
Board, since he wrote in a memorandum to the Board:
"With relation to compulsory orders for production of ordi-
nary staple commodities, as we construe the statutes, there is con-
templated a taking of the finished commodity rather than an order
for involuntary performance of service. The language used in
the statutes, and the clearer constitutionality which would result
from the first construction, tend to bring us to our conclusions,
although there might be commandeer orders which would ap-
proach very closely orders for the performance of services." 32
Unfortunately, there is a temporal hiatus between the comman-
deering of the output and the existence of the finished product.
Channing omits the reasoning which led him to his conclusion. It is
difficult to see how an effective "commandeering", which by definition
would deprive the individual of the option not to perform in every
case, could be anything short of involuntary.
However, in practice, the individual does have that option. Pur-
suing the analysis further, if the taking of the product does not occur
(due to the unwillingness of the owner, a complete inversion of the
eminent domain theory), then the owner may be fined or his property
commandeered. He is fined on the theory that he has violated a law
which called for a positive act; but this is incompatible with the prin-
ciple of the requisitioning of the product, since, as we have seen,
Channing conceded that if the statute looked to positive action to be
performed under all circumstances, it would amount to involuntary
31. Benedict v. United States, 271 Fed. 714, 719 (E. D. N. Y. i92o). "A requisi-
tion is a one-sided exercise of authority."
32. GAuT, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER PRICES (920) 397.
686 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
servitude. Moreover, the requisition does not call for any act on the
part of the individual.
On the other hand, the property may be commandeered and a rea-,
sonable compensation paid for the rental. That this rental will be most
generous is indicated by Prince Line v. United States33 wherein the
Court directed that the fair rental should be based on the war profits
made by the government in the use of the property. If the fair rental
is to be an exact equivalent, or a quid pro quo, then the deterrent
implicit in commandeering vanishes. However, the provision may
operate as a penalty in fact because of the fear of offending public
opinion in defying the government, and what Robert Brookings, the
World War I Price Chief, quite acutely saw as a hesitancy on the part
of industry to rely on the courts to award just compensation equiva-
lent to lucrative war profits. Moreover, to regard government opera-
tion as intended to be a substitute for private operation rather than as
a deterrent is to misapprehend the actualities of the situation.
Thus the penalty provisions of the Act are based on contradictory
assumptions-namely, that the industry has failed to comply with what
must be deemed a regulation (in view of the option retained by the
individual) and hence is subjected to a penalty, or that a taking of the
product having failed, a taking of the plant is resorted to. Logically,
if the industry has failed to abide by a regulation, then the taking of
the plant, as well as the fine, should be regarded as a penalty, and hence
non-compensable. At both points of time the true meaning of the stat-
ute points to a regulation. Since the industry has in fact the option
to decline the government's order, or even to withdraw from the indus-
try, its consent can hardly be called a requisition. The consequences
that follow such a refusal even as to the taking of the plant are
intended to act as a penalty to deter such refusal.
34
RESTRICTIVE EFFECT OF THE ACT
We have seen previously that one edge of the Damocles sword,
suspended over the head of manufacturers, was the threat to com-
mandeer their output. The effect of such a threat is that the manu-
facturer will be compelled to deal with the government. - But the com-
pulsory order, since it is a requisition, entitles the owner to full market
33. 283 Fed. 535 (E. D. N. Y. 1922), writ of error dismissed, 263 U. S. 727 (1923).
See also Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States, 284 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922).
34. In Liggett & Myers v. United States, 274 U. S. 215 (1927), the facts clearly de-
noted a compulsory order, and the Court so held. Attorney-General Mitchell, however,
disputed such a finding contending that there was no requisition, since under the theory
of eminent domain, the United States must "come and take it", whereas the production
of goods under a contract manifests a willingness to comply with the order, the taking
is contingent on this volition, and thus the fundamental premise of eminent domain has
been banished.
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value, and thus makes obstructionism sound business policy in dealing
with the government, in order to compel the issuance of the compul-
sory order. That prevailing market price would be the measure of
recovery was conceded by Channing in a memorandum to the Board.
The opportunity to recover just compensation or market value is
overtly contingent on the refusal of the manufacturer to enter into a
voluntary agreement which would foreclose him from subsequent liti-
gation. Thus in American Smelting Co. v. United States,35 a seller
of copper to the government claimed that, though the language of con-
tract had been used, since factually the threat of compulsion was immi-
nent in the statute, it had in fact yielded to duress. The argument was
dismissed by the Supreme Court in these words:
"It may be true that the claimant was yielding to the statute
in a general way, and did not discriminate between what it was
required to yield, and what it could reserve. But if it had desired
to stand upon its legal rights, it should have saved the question of
the price. It did not do so, but on the contrary so far as appears
was willing to contract and was content in the main with what
was offered." 36
The rationale implies a demarcation between a voluntary contract
and a compulsory order, the logic of which seems to be untenable.
Without adopting a Benthamite extreme, it is mere artifice to impute
universal volition, manifested, allegedly, by submission without com-
plaint, in the presence of potential compulsion. The manufacturer is
confronted with a Hobson's choice-since it is certain that if the vol-
untary negotiations fail the requisition will issue, the ambiguity of
mnind of the manufacturer as to whether, he is complying with a requi-
sition, or voluntarily supplying the product is quite comprehensible.
To force an election where the transition from a contract to a requisi-
tion is a mere matter of words is to erect a fictitious partition where
none exists in fact. The reasoning, at odds with that in the Mawhin-
ney case, in practice discourages cooperation, since the contractor, to
preserve his right to sue, and moreover to protect himself against suits
by civilian obligees, will prefer that the requisition issue. And yet,
had the Court decided otherwise in the American Smelting Co. case,
the courts would have been swamped with litigation, and it is arguable
that all attempts to secure voluntary agreement or to get a price lowef
than prevailing market value would have been nullified by the judicial
inference of compulsion in all government contracts.
Baruch attributed the circuitous method of price fixing adopted
by the Board to the constitutional nemesis of "just compensation." 37
35. 259 U. S. 75 (1922).
36. Id. at 78.
37. BARUcrH, REPORT OF THE WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD (192) 75, 76.
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If the government engages in a bona fide taking, it is bound to pay
market value. Price fixing is thus rendered nugatory, unless the trans-
action is successfully disguised as a voluntary offer by the industry to
furnish the government with a product at a price below the prevailing
one on the market.
A further consequence was pointed out to the War Policies Com-
mission by Attorney-General Mitchell in a discussion of the Baruch
Plan, envisaging total price control. 8  Mitchell separated out the two
areas of control-as to fixing of prices in the private markets, Mitchell
contended that no opinion could be asserted in advance of the emer-
gency, the latitude of power depending on the factual economic basis
then present. However, as to the fixing of prices of products bought
by the government, Mitchell argued that Congress could not constitu-
tionally directly control the prices of products bought by the govern-
ment, since, if the owner is dissatisfied with the price offered by the
government, he is entitled to have just compensation ascertained and
fixed by the courts. Thus stabilization would be illegal, in the matter
of government prices. If, however, the two fields of civilian and gov-
ernment prices were thus divorced, the result would be such chaos as
to make the plan unworkable. The government purchases goods in
varying quantities. Must the prices be left uncontrolled, since the gov-
ernment may purchase a pound here, or a bushel there? Where can
the line be drawn?
The position is fundamentally correct, unless the effect of the Gold
Cases 3 9 has modified the doctrine. Insofar as the government is tak-
ing by eminent domain, its liability is measurable by market value, and
it seems to be morally bound to leave that market value unimpaired.
Logical consistency can only be achieved by the replacement of the
requisitioning by the regulatory principle- in the case of government
purchases.
ILLEGALITY OF INDIRECT PRICE CONTROL
It remains to consider the insufficiency of the present statutory
authority in respect to "voluntary" price agreements obtained through
the latent threat of commandeering or withholding of priority. As a
practical matter, it is debatable how far it is possible to bludgeon an
industry which is conscious of its indispensability for industrial needs.
In addition, however, the efficacy of this method is questionable from
a legal viewpoint. How far can such agreements be sustained against
38. Hearings Before House Military Affairs Committee on H. R. 3 and H. R.
5293, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 734.
39. Norman v. B. & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 24o (1935) and cases in footnote, id. at
240.
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an affirmative showing of duress, particularly where the use of that
duress is a matter of notoriety as to the last war and the present emer-
gency? Conceding that a compulsory order is one entered into under
duress, we have seen that the question may be one of fact---did the
parties believe and understand that a compulsory order was being
resorted to by the government? However, the issue may arise in a
different fashion, with a claim by a contractor that though the con-
tract in form had been voluntary, yet his consent had been secured by
duress, other than the statutory compulsion.
Conceivably the court might dismiss the claim on the ground that
a valid election had been made. However, if the circumstances were
scrutinized with care, the basis for an opposite conclusion could well
be found. The distinction between legality and illegality in the gov-
ernment's threat to commandeer the plant is a tenuous one, turning on
subjective intent. Undoubtedly, if the industry is unwilling to furnish
supplies to the government on what the latter deems equitable terms,
the statute gives the government the right to intervene, commandeer
the plant and operate it to supply its needs. To the extent, however,
that its statement does not mirror factual intention, but is employed
as a weapon to coerce, with prevision of that result, there can be little
escape from the conclusion of duress. Since it is a matter of common
knowledge that a large-scale appropriation of private industry is unfea-
sible in time of emergency, the basis of a finding of duress is apparent.
It is true that the government, like a private customer, has the
privilege to grant or deny an order on what terms it pleases, but the
vice of the situation lies in the fact that arms-length bargaining is
absent, since the government has more cards in its hands than does
the private customer. Thus, through priorities, it can virtually force
acceptance on its own terms-the choice, in a real sense, is between
the "rock and the whirlpool". 40  Though the government has active
control over the railroads, and potential control over the fuel supply,
it is difficult to support the legality of price fixing and the regulation
of priorities, predicated ostensibly on voluntary agreements, but based
in reality on the threat to exert powers growing out of its strategic
position. It should be noted in the case of secondary priority that it
is administered without relation to the need for transportation, denial
of transportation being employed unconcealedly as the effective threat.
Apart from the important role played by public opinion in time of
4o. Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R. Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 593 (1926). "Hav-
ing regard to form alone, the act here is an offer to the private carrier of a privilege
which the state may grant or deny, upon a condition, which the carrier is free to ac-
cept or reject. In reality, the carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the
rock and the whirlpoo,-an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to its live-
lihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden."
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crisis as an instrument of coercion, the entire purport of the doctrine
of "unconstitutional conditions", as stated by the court, establishes that
an unconstitutional objective cannot be achieved through indirection by
the exercise of means that are ordinarily constitutional.41
In the administration of the Lever (Food and Fuel Control)
Act,42 the coercion was exercised not in individual negotiations, but in
blanket fashion at the outset, since the groups affected were required
to be licensed, the sanction employed being the subsequent revocation
of that license. There is no doubt that a licensing scheme is an effec-
tive scheme of administration for centralizing control, in that the
power to revoke or the threat to revoke the license can be used freely
to enforce compliance. The courts were ready to give effect to the
license provision by denying relief to an unlicensed dealer. In consid-
ering the practicability of extending license control to war-time indus-
try, we should note that the effectiveness of the device in enlarging
legal power is dubious indeed. The power to attach conditions to the
grant of a license where the power to grant or deny that license is
undisputed, is the vexatious issue confronting the courts in the field
of "unconstitutional conditions". But it is an arbitrary assumption of
power to attach conditions to a license where the power to deny that
license does not exist ab i'jitio. Thus licensing, though a convenient
administrative mechanism, does not avoid the problem of the legal
basis of control. Rather, a decision to license is a four-square con-
frontation of the legal issue, since it is tantamount to a legislative
declaration that the licensed groups had been subjected to regulatory
control in the exercise of some Federal power.
In referring to cases in which the courts invalidated agreements,
under license as secured by duress, 43 Baruch testified before the War
Policies Commission that price control through "leadership" would
never again be possible, and that broad statutory authority in direct
terms would be necessary.
THE SOLUTION BY THE EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT
The government must be able to purchase goods independently of
market value; otherwise, the price paid by the government is tied as
a tail to the spiralling kite of market value. This, however, could be
done only by indirect means as long as the requisition concept was
retained. The advance in constitutional doctrine in recent years per-
41. Hale, Uwonstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 COL. L.
REV. 321; Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 879.
42. 40 STAT. 276 (1917).
43. United States v. Smith, 39 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. Ist, 1930) ; United States v.
Avery, 30 F. (2d) 728 (N. D. N. Y. 1927); United States v. McFarland, 15 F. (2d)
823 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
PRICE CONTROL IN WAR AND EMERGENCY
mits a straigh.tforward and direct solution-grounded on the principle
of regulation. 44 The present Price Control Act 45 is based on a regu-
latory doctrine. The purpose stated in Section i (a), "to further the
national defense and security," is in strict pursuance of a delegated
Federal power. Offenders against price orders are subjected to pen-
alties as in all regulations. The Government is empowered to secure
an injunction where a violation has been committed or is about to be
committed. This is a statutory injunction and no proof of irreparable
injury or inadequate remedy by civil or criminal action need by shown.
The Government can punish the commercial buyer, as well as the seller.
Additionally, of course, the indirect sanctions used by OPA prior to
the Act are in force. Non-commercial buyers may sue sellers for $50
or treble damages; in all other cases the Government may bring a civil
suit in its own behalf.
46
Voluntary agreements are authorized by the Act.47 To be sure,
violations of these agreements are not subject to the criminal penalties
of the Act. OPA's present policy is to frame the formal agreement so
that signers are subject to civil suits by injured parties under the third
party beneficiary rule. In cases where voluntary agreements have been
nullified by violations of signers, non-signing producers, or dealers
engaging in speculative resales, OPA has been quick to supplant the
agreement by a formal schedule.
As an implement to its enforcement powers OPA is authorized to
license. 48  It can issue a blanket license for all members of an industry,
but it lacks the power to withhold the initial license from any mem-
ber. Since a warning notice must be sent to the offender after the first
violation, two violations are requisite for a revocation. The big stick
of licensing was somewhat blunted by the decision of Congress that
licenses should not be revocable by administrative action, but rather by
court procedure.49  However, the sole issue in" such litigation is the
fact of violation, 'not the validity or reasonableness of the price order.
From the start OPA has not limited itself to the price of goods
bought by the government; the War Industries Board extended .gov-
ernment prices to civilian purchasers only towards the end of its reign
and then only after great debate. In this connection, an interesting
constitutional question was brought out before the War Policies Com-
mission. There are two divergent purposes to be served by price fix-
44. Hannah, Some Aspects of Price Control in War Tine (I94I) 27 Cowu'. L. Q.
21, 47; Note, Anerican Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 427, 486.
45. Pub. L. No 421 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 3o, i942).
46. Id., tit. I, §4(a5; tit. II, §205(e).
47. Id., tit. I, § 5.
48. Id., tit. II, §205() I).
49. Id., tit. I, § 205(f) (2).
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ing. One is to prevent profiteering at the government's expense and
an increase in public expenditures; the other is to aid in the more effec-
tive conduct of the war by preventing economic dislocation and dis-
ruption of the morale. The effectuation of the latter aim may result,
incidentally, in the effectuation of the former. However, the legiti-
mate spring for action must be the more efficient conduct of the war,
though this might be hampered by the inflation resulting from exorbi-
tant expenditures.
It follows that the more drastic Baruch Plan is more readily sus-
tainable on constitutional grounds than a piecemeal system of control,
confined to commodities purchased by the government. In that case,
it might be contended, and with some justification, that the govern-
ment's object is not so much to regulate the price structure as, under
the subterfuge of regulation, to diminish the amount of compensation
it is obliged to pay under a taking.
REGULATORY CONCEPT APPLIED TO CIVILIAN PURCHASES
The power to fix prices, under the Lever Act was specifically
granted as to wheat and fuel. Fuel has a dual use, in that it is a
civilian necessary and is also required in large quantities by the gov-
ernment. The contrast in application between a regulation and a tak-
ing is here accentuated in a vivid fashion.
It is necessary to advert here to the method employed by the gov-
ernment in the last war in fixing prices for its purchases and which
was applied also to the fixing of the price of fuel. The essence of
price fixing was the bulk-line principle; 50 the price of a standardized
commodity was arbitrarily fixed at that price sufficient to cover the
costs, plus a reasonable profit for the marginal competitor supplying
the last unit of that proportion of the product necessary for the gov-
ernment's needs. Thus the low-cost producer received, in effect, a
public subsidy measurable by the difference in efficiency between him-
self and the marginal competitor. On the other hand, the high cost
producer above bulk-line was virtually driven from the industry, since
he could not profitably fill a government contract, nor, since the price
was made uniform for government and civilian purchases, could he
compete in the civilian market.
In the present-day operations of OPA, definitive prices are not
set in two fact situations. In one case the administrator promulgates
a temporary price regulation which under the act is effective for only
5o. For a description of bulk-line procedure, see Taussig, Price Fixing as Seen by
a Price Fixer (IM1) 33 Q. J. Ecow. 205, and HAWY, WARIm CONTROL OF PRICES
(194o) 62.
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sixty days and must be based on prices prevailing five days prior to
the issuance of the order.51 OPA employs this medium in cases where
action is imperative, but an industry study has not been completed. In
the second case OPA finds it impossible to prescribe uniform prices
because of the diversity of markets or geographical areas or because
no markets exist. In these two situations the practice has been to set
the price for each individual on the basis of the price charged by him
to the same class of purchaser during a specific period. However,
where prices can be fixed, bulk-line is as applicable today as it was
in the last war. Of course, the term "bulk-line" is not used today, nor
does the determination of price assume to the same scientific precision
which bulk-line claimed. Prices are set more or less on the basis of
expediency; but cost is the most important factor in the decision.
Prior to the issuance of a schedule or regulation, exhaustive ques-
tionnaires are sent to all members of the industry inquiring as to costs
of operation. The price, as in bulk-line, generally covers about 8o to
9o per cent. of the members of an industry on the basis of costs. The
remaining 10 to 20 per cent. must apply for exemption under the
"hardship and inequity" clause contained in regulations, and excep-
tions are denied where the production is proven to be for only civilian
use. Thus the net effect of the procedure today is that bulk-line still
prevails, and this conclusion is not altered by the fact that the recent
statute exhorts the Administrator to give due consideration to prices
as between October i and 15, 1941, with adjustments for increases
and decreases in production, distribution, and transportation costs.
Baruch, in his 1921 Report, conceded that the Board, in applying
bulk-line, had been advised by their lawyers that the touchstone of
value in a taking would be market value but stated that since, accord-
ing to classical economic theory, market value tends to gravitate toward
cost, in the abnormal war economy it was justifiable to base value on
costs. The bulk-line approach was submitted to judicial test, however,
in the cases under the Lever Act.
In Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States 52 the petitioner had
orders for the sale of large amounts of coal above that fixed by the
Fuel Administrator. In consequence of sales at the fixed price, he
lost the opportunity to make a large profit. In a suit against the
government for the difference, or "just compensation", Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
"We see no ground for the claim. The claimant in conse-
quence of the regulation mentioned sold some of its coal to other
parties at less than what otherwise it would have got. That is all.
51. Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942) tit. I, § 2(a).
52. 259 U. S. 188 (1922).
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It now seeks to hold the government answerable for making a rule-
that it saw fit to obey. Whether the rule was valid or void no
such consequence follows. Making the rule was not a taking and
no lawmaking power promises by implication to make good losses
that may be incurred by obedience to its commands. If the law
requires a party to give up property to a third person without ade-
quate compensation the remedy is, if necessary, to refuse to obey
it, not to sue the lawmaker." 53
On facts similar to those of the Morrisdale case, in Pine Hill Co.
v. United States, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "
"A liability in any case is not to be imposed upon a govern-
ment without clear words. But liability for a regulation, for the
consequences of a law, on the part of the legislative power, is most
unusual, and where, as here, the liability would mount to great
sums, only the plainest language would warrant a Court in taking
it to be implied."
These decisions are unique in their outright recognition of the
regulatory nature of price fixing. Three considerations impelled the
decisions. (i) The law is obviously based on the exercise of a dele-
gated Federal power, the war power, rather than on the inherent power
of eminent domain; (2) the government is not enriched by dealings
between civilians, and hence no implied contract to reimburse can be
spelled out; (3) the owner is not compelled to sell, and hence the uni-
lateral compulsion of eminent domain is lacking. E. N. Griswold and
Thomas D. Thacher in briefs submitted to the War Policies Commis-
sion stated that the fixing of all prices, even in civilian transactions
would be subject to the constitutional right of review by the cotirts
as to just compensation; these opinions ignore the plain import of
Holmes' decisions.
In Highland v. Russell Car Co.55 a coal owner contracted to sell
coal at a higher price than that fixed under the Lever Act. He sued
for the difference, alleging that Congress had no power to fix prices
without providing just compensation for those who, in the absence of
such regulation, might have sold their product for more. In denying
recovery Mr. Justice Butler traced the history of the legislation and
asserted that as a measure enacted in the due exercise of the war power
there was a strong presumption of validity to sustain it. He went on
to say, however, that the principal purpose of the Lever Act was to
enable the government to acquire fuel at reasonable prices. "Plaintiff
was free to keep his coal, but it would have been liable to seizure by
53. Id. at 19o.
54. 259 U. S. 191, 196 (1922).
55. 279 U. S. 253 (1929) ; Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 267 U. S. 292 (1925) ; E. I.
DuPont de Nernours & Co. v. Hughes, 5o F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931), semble.
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the government." 56 In that case, Mr. Justice Butler said, it did not
appear that plaintiff would have been entitled to more.
In pointing out that "the plaintiff was free to keep his coal", Mr.
justice Butler was extending the analysis of the validity of price fixing
as a regulation under the war power. In the same vein, he might have
adverted to the Morrisdale and Pine Hill cases to corroborate the point
that if the duty attaches to render just compensation, a suit against
the government would be successful. However, Mr. Justice Butler's
assertion that the property if requisitioned would be worth no more,
and his statement that the primary intent of the Lever Act was to
supply the government with the commodities at reasonable prices are
unfounded. On the contrary, where the property is requisitioned a
different judicial approach is adopted.
That the hallowed measure of compensation in a "taking" is mar-
ket value was reiterated in several war-time requisition cases. 57 How-
ever, the rule becomes difficult of application where a free market price
has become a fixed market price. Under such circumstances, the gov-
ernment should be liable for no more than the owner would have been
able to obtain in the absence of a requisition, namely, the price in the
fixed market. Judicial reasoning, deeply ingrained with the habit of
basing value on market price in condemnation, has balked at adopting
a course which Attorney-General Mitchell adduced as a reductio ad
absurdum arising from the separation of the two powers.
"If Congress has the power to provide for fixing prices-
generally in private transactions, it could then establish a market
price which may be persuasive or controlling in determining just
compensation where the government takes property for public use,
and so through the exercise of one sovereign power, that of estab-
lishing prices under the war power may thus indirectly affect or
control the price it must pay when exercising the power of eminent
domain." 58
In the New River Collieries Co.59 case, since the prevailing domes-
tic price of coal was the one fixed by the government, the Supreme
Court upheld the exclusion of evidence as to that price. Moreover,
evidence as to the owners' cost of production plus a reasonable profit,
the bulk-line method, was also held rightly excluded. The Court, how-
ever, managed to find an export market for coal, and rendered just
56. 279 U. S. 253, 262 (1929).
57. Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341 (1927); United States v. New River
Collieries, 262 U. S. 341 (1923) ; Seaboard R. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299
(1923).
58. Hearings Before House Military Affairs Committee on H. R. 3 and H. R.
5293, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 735.
59. 262 U. S. 341 (1923).
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compensation on the basis of "spot prices" there prevailing. The result
was that the government was forced to pay $2o a ton for coal which
had cost $5 a ton.
The Court's decision is vulnerable on several grounds: (i) "spot
market" prices for coal are notoriously in excess of prevailing contract
prices; (2) whether the plaintiff would have sold in that market is
purely hypothetical; (3) if all owners sold their coal there, the high
price there prevailing would not exist; (4) the validity of the export
market price as unaffected by the domestic situation is exiremely dubi-
ous; (5) it was against public policy to sell in the export market. The
plaintiff could have done many other things with his coal contrary to
public policy, such as speculating and hoarding.
Paradoxically, however, a situation may arise in which no market
can be discovered other than the one functioning under govermnent
control. That is, the price may be fixed effectively in all markets, as
OPA hopes to accomplish today. In L. Vogelstein & Co. v. United
States,60 the government was sued for the market price of copper
taken, allegedly, under compulsory order. No market was available
other than the one in which the price fixed by the War Industries
Board prevailed. The Court, therefore, declared that fixed price con-
stituted the market price. It is thus evident that even a palpably ille-
gal attempt to stabilize the price structure for government purchases
would serve a useful purpose in that, though the government were
compelled to pay full compensation after the war, the prices for its
purchases would be kept under control. More than that, such com-
pensation might not be forthcoming on suit, if no free market could
be found, as the Vogelstein case demonstrates.
The courts seem to have been oblivious to the complete futility of
an attempt to accommodate conventional legal principles to an organi-
cally different economy. 6' Price, as the great regulator of the market
and the flow of resources, could not be entrusted to the workings of the
ordinary laws of supply and demand. The rules of the peace-time
competitive economy had to be adjourned, since the extraordinary gov-
ernment demand, unabated by any rise in price, exceeding available
supply, would cause prices to skyrocket. To eliminate the demand
attributable to ordinary civilian needs, priorities were instituted; to
6o. 262 U. S. 337 (1923). There were decisions by state courts to the same effect.
Wis. & Ark. Lumber Co. v. Buschow Lumber Co., 257 S. W. 840 (Mo. App. 1924);
Clements v. Cook, 112 Wash. 217, 191 Pac. 874 (Ig2o).
6i. C. G. Blake Co. v. United States, 275 Fed. 86i (S. D. Ohio, i92r). See Na-
tional City Bank of New York v. United States, 275 Fed. 855, 860 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
"The government, as a war measure under the exercise of governmental powers, may
fix prces, either directly or by governmental regulations necessarily reducing the
prices; but this does not authorize it to acquire the property in invitum at such reduced
prices." Prince Line v. United States, 283 Fed. 535, 540 (E. D. N. Y. 1922).
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further eliminate the influence of the segment of civilian demand, price
fixing was introduced, based not on market value but on costs.
It therefore appears that the theoretical free market price which
the courts assign for just compensation is precisely that skyrocketing
price which the government seeks to avoid paying. Any other market
price is sham and illusory.
We have noted that the courts adopted the regulatory theory in
the case of price fixing between civilians. To compartmentalize the
different aspects of control, to regard the government's relationship
with industry as a government taking and the regulation of civilian
business as in a different category, is to apply traditional judicial
dogma in a fictitious world. Actually, a coherent unity or merger
subsists between the two spheres. The following points illustrate this
unity. (i) The government and civilians buy in the same market.
(2) The War Industries Board found that it was essential to extend
the government price to civilians. (3) The bulk-line cost method was
applied in both fields, fuel being fixed in price in that manner. (4)
Both price frameworks are intimately intertwined in the problems of
the overall price structure, since the latter is determined collectively
by all prices paid, regardless of the public or private capacity of the
buyer. (5) It is impossible to stabilize the prices of industrial com-
modities unless basic component costs are stabilized.
The simplified approach to the problem is to view the fixing of
the price between industry and the government as part of the inte-
grated whole of regulation, rather than as an isolated event requiring
just compensation, the amount of which the government may be able
to control in fact by its control of the private markets, or even by the
use of extralegal methods, as we noted in the Vogelstein case. If the
price to be paid is the fixed price prevailing in the entire market, then
the government is merely another customer, endowed, however, with
certain prerogatives o[ direct action to fill its needs. From an objec-
tive viewpoint, the sale to a private customer and the sale to the gov-
ernment have the same effect on the balance sheet of an industry.
From the standpoint of the government, it has eliminated a large seg-
ment of the civilian demand, and in an entrepreneurial capacity has
put itself in the shoes of the former customer. Thus, to favor a par-
ticular seller with a higher price because a free market may somehow,
somewhere, be unearthed is a thoroughly indefensible procedure.
In the event that the price is fixed in the civilian markets, it seems
desirable that the duty to supply the government with the finished
product at the same price be stipulated as a regulation. The duty to
deal with the government is no more burdensome than the regulations
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as to the price at which the commodity can exchange. Both should be
integrated in the same sovereign command. This, the present act fails
to do.
It is certain that the just compensation concept is not obliterated
under the impact of the war power. According to Mr. Justice
Hughes's interpretation of Ex parte Milligan 62 as- rendered in the
Blaisdell case,63 in times of emergency a constitutional power may be
expanded by judicial exposition in a case where the provision is set
forth in merely general terms. Thus, the due process clause, lacking
any specific definition, may in time of war become attenuated almost
to the point of final extinction. However, the just compensation clause
does not admit of pliable construction and a taking with anything less
than just compensation would be a direct denial of the constitutional
mandate. The failure of the present Act to encompass dealings of
private individuals with the government within the regulatory frame-
work, as applied to dealings between civilians, gives rise to serious
questions. Compulsory orders under Section 9 of the Burke-Wads-
worth Act are placed with great frequency. In view of past judicial
action, what will be the attitude of the courts if a claimant protests
against the use of a fixed price in an eminent domain proceeding?
The problem arises more acutely in another context. Under the
recent Property Requisitioning Act 64 the commandeering is totally
disassociated from the fixing of prices. In the latter part of Febru-
ary the War Production Board requested holders of aluminum stocks
to make them available to the Metals Reserve Corporation at prices as
much as 50 per cent. below market value, the lowered prices being jus-
tified on the ground that a substantial portion of the aluminum would
have to be remelted. The government threatened to use its requisition
power in case of non-compliance. Can a holder of aluminum in such
a case get full market value in a requisition proceeding, rather than
the reduced government price?
SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT
Under the recent Act hearings are not essential, since the action
is quasi-legislative rather than quasi-administrative, affecting classes
of persons rathef than individuals. But Congress has enjoined the
Administrator, as far as practicable, to advise and consult with rep-
resentative members of the industry affected.6 5 OPA Regulations No.
62. 4 Wall. 2, 120 (U. S. I866).
63. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 425-426 (1934).
See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 88 (192o) rejecting the
viewpoint of W nambaugh, War Emnergeney Legislafon-A General View (IM17) 30
HARv. L. REv. 663, that the Constitution does not operate in war-time.
64. Pub. L. No. 274, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (Oct. I6, 1941).
65. Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942) tit. I, § 2(a).
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i, recently issued, state that formal hearings will be entirely optional
with the Administrator. However, consultations with industrial ad-
visory committees and representatives help OPA to avoid arbitrary
action, which would give rise to numerous actions for review.
After the issuance of an order, a formal procedure is established
for protest to OPA and for subsequent review by the Emergency
Court of Appeals.66 If a person is not subject directly to the order,
he can only file a petition for amendment under OPA Regulations
No. i. If the schedule can be altered to fit his particular case, an
affected person can file a petition for an exception, and upon denial a
protest can be made.
Upon what basis can such a protest be grounded? If price con-
trol is properly viewed as a regulation rather than as a requisition,
then it is futile to appeal on the ground that a just compensation for
the product is not fixed or that a schedule does not allow a "fair return
on fair value" on his business as a whole. On the other hand, as the
General Counsel of OPA stated in the hearings before the House Com-
mittee, the standard of review laid down by the Act, "arbitrary and
capricious", is broader than the usual "substantial-relation" rule
adopted in administrative proceedings. Thus in addition to the cus-
tomary ground for review, an affected person may appeal on the
following grounds:
i. That the order is arbitrary in that the rate set is confisca-
tory for most of the members of the industry (see Hegeman V.
Baldwin).
2. That the order is arbitrary in that the statement of con-
siderations as affixed to the price order under the mandate of the
law is at variance with the actual provisions of the order.
3. That the order is arbitrary in that OPA proceeded with-
out ascertaining proper economic data or that the data as sub-
mitted by industry members was ignored.
4. That the order is arbitrary in that no differentiation or
discrimination is made between different grades of goods or dif-
ferent members of the industry.
5. That the order is arbitrary in that it is unintelligently or
unreasonably drawn as that a higher price is set for a lower grade
of goods.
Additionally, the Act provides that a protest and an appeal can be
made on the ground that the order is illegal. This could best apply in
'cases where the price order ignores standards as to farm products and
goods processed from them, or where the Administrator failed to give
66. Id., tit. II, § 2o4.
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due consideration to the October 1-15 level of prices, or where, in con-
travention of the statute, the order altered the normal trade practice
of an industry.
"A FAIR RETURN ON FAIR VALUE" FOR WAR INDUSTRIES
The retention of the requisition is tenable only as to its modified
form-"fair return on fair value" of the going concern. Applicable
to the product itself, compensation is measurable by the price prior to
alteration, thus nullifying the adventure in price fixing.
The occasion for the employment of the concept is unnecessary in
the exertion of the war power, but is cognate to the "affectation with
the public interest" doctrine. Under a broad-gauged view of the essen-
tial nature of the doctrine, it presents itself as an excellent medium for
the projection of the controls of price fixing'and priorities. To what
extent do war-time industries partake of the nature of public utilities?
The problem may be viewed in its multi-dimensional aspects thus:
(I) From the standpoint of the public exigency, a business which
ordinarily is exempt from public control may hold such an immediate
relationship to the public need as to require regulation. The intimate
relationship of war-time industry with the effectuation of the public
welfare during armament is clearly in this category.
(2) Due to the inelasticity of supply in relation to demand, the
"regulative force of competition" in controlling price has been sus-
pended. Thus the public is justified, as in the case of public utilities,
in setting a price which would prevail theoretically in the presence of
competition.
(3) The features characteristic of public utilities are conspicuous
in the heavy goods, war-time industries. The essentiality of the serv-
ice is undisputed. Due to the physical limitations of expansion, a
practical monopoly is enjoyed. They are endowed with monopolistic
privileges akin to utilities, that is, priorities. Most of these industries
operate under heavy overhead costs and decreasing unit costs. The
government, as a large consumer in place of the public, with steady
industrial demand on "peak" production seeks to lower the charges it
must pay.
It is impossible to calculate just compensation on the basis of the
bulk-line system since it postulates a uniform unit cost independent of
volume of production. A fair return on total operation will depend
on getting a sufficient volume of business, unless it be assumed 'that
marginal costs of production are uniform regardless of volume of
output.
The bulk-line approach (or its equivalent) enhances the return to
the efficiently conducted utility due to the large differential. Since
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average cost shrinks with optimum rate of production, profit rate
increases. Moreover, as the British experience in World War I dem-
onstrated, there are certain real savings incident to war-time produc-
tion, arising from the lack of competition and the steadiness or pre-
dictability of demand.
67
The plain legal import of the public utility doctrine encourages
an effort to prevent distorted profits by devices calculated to limit war-
time profits to a "fair return on fair value". There are three devices
that are to be considered.
The first, and the obvious one, is the subsidization of high-cost
producers who are responsible for a small volume of the output rather
than to permit that minor output to influence the price. This has been
applied recently by OPA in regard to copper, lead, and zinc in accord-
ance with Section 2 (e) of the Act, authorizing government purchases
from high-cost producers. Under this modification of bulk-line,
quotas were set for individual mines and over-quota production was
rewarded by specific premiums. The second method, tried success-
fully in the boot industry by Britain during the last war, is to group
together manufacturers with roughly uniform costs. The third, and
most controversial due to heavy administrative difficulties, is the
"equalization pool" device.68 This was strenuously urged before the
War Industries Board in the last war, and Britain is carrying on
experiments in this direction at the present time.
A recapture provision for excess profits appears to be the logical
solution, but if the total profits are received in the first instance by the
industry subject to subsequent recapture, a repetition of the debacle
under the Transportation Act of 192o is inevitable. If, instead of
bulk-line, the price were set at average cost plus a reasonable profit,
an equalization pool might be established to transfuse excess profits
from low-cost to high-cost producers. Each member would receive
initially his standard pre-emergency return. The burden would then
be cast upon each to offer proof of the difference, if any, between
such return and a "fair return on fair value", wherein an opportunty
would be afforded to show increased operational costs attributable to
the heavy government demand. To preserve the advantages of the
incentive to efficiency, a sliding-scale scheme might be combined, as a
moderate reward to low-cost production.
Such a plan has the practical advantage over the excess profits
tax as a device to reduce profits, in that it combines that objective
with drastic lowering of price and control over the price structure.
67. LLoYi, EXPERIMENTS IN STATE CONTROL (1924) 320, 321.
68. For the constitutionality of the "equalization pool" device, see United States v.
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 570 (1939).
